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POLICY, PREEMPTION, AND POT: 
EXTRATERRITORIAL CITIZEN 
JURISDICTION 
GABRIEL J. CHIN* 
Abstract: In contemporary America, legislators send messages about values 
through symbolic legislation and lawsuits. One conflict is between states where 
marijuana is legal and others that continue to ban it. This Article evaluates what 
might happen if anti-marijuana states made it illegal for their citizens to pur-
chase or use marijuana, borrowing a page from the playbook of activists op-
posed to reproductive choice who propose that if Roe v. Wade is overturned, in-
dividuals could be prohibited from traveling to another state for the purpose of 
obtaining an abortion. Although such laws would be hard to enforce, they still 
present important questions of state authority. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized state jurisdiction over citizens and over state territory. If, say, Alabama 
prohibited gambling in its territory, or by its citizens anywhere in the world, 
while Nevada’s public policy was to allow gambling in its territory, a difficult 
conflict would be presented. However, the marijuana controversy does not pre-
sent the same problem. Federal law categorically prohibits possession, use, and 
distribution of marijuana. In order to hold that state marijuana laws are not 
preempted by the federal ban, courts have found that the states do not have a 
public policy in favor of marijuana, they merely decline to prohibit it. As a re-
sult, the policies of the anti-marijuana states do not conflict with the interests of 
other states in the way that states opposed to abortion or gambling might con-
flict with states affirmatively allowing those activities. Although the law in this 
area is not particularly developed, making reliable prediction difficult, a state’s 
national ban on marijuana seems much more likely to pass muster than would a 
ban on activities affirmatively promoted by another state. 
INTRODUCTION 
Battles over many contemporary social questions have been through 
enactment of laws symbolically and practically reflecting particular posi-
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 * Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair & Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School 
of Law. In case it helps the reader evaluate the author’s perspective, the author personally believes 
the war on drugs was racist in origin and effect, has been a costly failure (except as an employ-
ment-generating and profit-making enterprise), and should be immediately abandoned in favor of 
a system designed to minimize the public health effects and other harms of abuse of dangerous 
drugs. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253 (2003) (exploring the impact of racial dis-
crimination on the imposition of collateral consequences on those convicted of crime). 
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tions. In recent decades, states have taken divergent positions on reproduc-
tive rights, same-sex marriage, racial segregation, the right of transgender 
persons to use particular bathrooms, legalized gambling, and firearms regu-
lation. As a result, conduct that is permitted, recognized, or required in one 
jurisdiction might be treated as a nullity or criminalized in another. For the 
moment, at least, with regard to same-sex marriage1 and reproductive rights,2 
the Supreme Court has stepped in to impose national uniformity as a matter 
of federal law.3 In other cases, disparate state policies remain in effect. 
The regulation of marijuana in the United States is a notable example 
of conflicting state laws. The federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) 4 
criminalizes the possession and use of marijuana under almost all circum-
stances, and some states do the same. A majority of states, however, now 
allow the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes; additionally, Alaska, 
California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, 
and the District of Columbia allow its use for recreational purposes.5 
In the future, the conflicts between inconsistent marijuana policies 
might be resolved.6 Perhaps the Supreme Court will conclude that the states 
are entitled under the Constitution to pursue their own marijuana policies.7 
Alternatively, as some bills have proposed,8 Congress could let the labora-
tories of democracy work and affirmatively authorize state choice subject to 
clear parameters.9 For the moment, however, state policies are in some ten-
sion, for example as reflected by Nebraska v. Colorado,10 a proposed origi-
nal action in the Supreme Court challenging Colorado’s marijuana laws as 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
 3 Another example is in the area of firearms. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 926B (West 2013) (al-
lowing state and local law enforcement officers to carry firearms nationally, regardless of conflict-
ing state law); id. § 926C (applicable to retired law enforcement officers). 
 4 Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–9042012)). 
 5State Marijuana Laws in 2017 Map, GOVERNING (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.governing.
com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html [https://perma.cc/B3YW-SYVB]. 
 6 See generally Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the United States, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 1301 (2013) (arguing that “the United States should seek to eliminate marijuana prohibition 
at the international level as it replaces prohibition with regulation in its own drug laws”). 
 7 See John Vigorito, Note, Creating Constitutional Cannabis: An Individual State’s Tenth 
Amendment Right to Legalize Marijuana, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 221, 238–48 (2014). 
 8 CARERS Act of 2015, H.R. 1538, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (proposing to add to CSA “the 
provisions of this title relating to marihuana shall not apply to any person acting in compliance 
with State law relating to the production, possession, distribution, dispensation, administration, 
laboratory testing, or delivery of medical marihuana”); Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act, 
H.R. 1013, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015) (proposing amendment to CSA stating that “this title and 
title III do not apply to marihuana”). 
 9  See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 
UCLA L. REV. 74, 81 (2015). 
 10 136 S. Ct. 1034, 1034 (2016) (denying motion for leave to file a bill of complaint). 
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impairing the interests of neighboring states11 and “seek[ing] a declaratory 
judgment that the CSA pre-empts” Colorado’s marijuana laws.12 
This Article considers the power of a state prohibiting the use of mari-
juana to carry out its policy through a particular kind of regulation: Under 
our federalism and constitutional law, can one state prohibit its citizens 
from using or buying marijuana elsewhere in the United States or anywhere 
in the world? The Supreme Court has recognized that states can exercise 
criminal jurisdiction based on both territory and citizenship. Concretely, 
under these sources of authority, could Oklahoma or Nebraska, concerned 
about marijuana use, criminalize conduct by their citizens in California or 
Colorado where marijuana use is perfectly legal or at least not criminalized? 
Questions of this sort are often answered by analyzing the interests of 
the jurisdictions involved. In some cases, there is no conflict. If Idaho pro-
hibited gambling by its citizens anywhere in the world, and Montana pro-
hibited gambling in its territory, it would not compromise the interests or 
authority of Montana if a Boise resident were prosecuted for gambling in 
Billings upon her return home. No transaction that Montana wants to pro-
mote has been frustrated, Montana suffers no costs, and Idaho has a greater 
interest in the fate of an Idaho citizen than does Montana. 
Nevertheless, if Nevada promotes gambling as a means of generating 
employment, tourism, and revenue, it would have an interest in whether a 
resident of Boise visiting Las Vegas were able to play cards or shoot dice. 
Note that the problem is not that there is a constitutional right to gamble; if 
such a right existed, questions of citizenship and territory would be irrele-
vant. Nor is it that a citizen of Idaho has a right not to be regulated by the 
state once she leaves its territory; the principle of citizen jurisdiction means 
that presence on a state’s territory is not the only source of obligation. The 
problem arises from the interests of states and their part in a national sys-
tem. Both Nevada and Idaho have an interest in the activities of an Idaho 
citizen in Las Vegas. Because gambling by an Idaho citizen in Las Vegas 
may be either punished or not, however, there is a conflict, and the goals of 
only one state can be realized. 
                                                                                                                           
 11 The complaint alleged: “Plaintiff States have incurred significant costs associated with the 
increased level of incarceration of 27 suspected and convicted felons on charges related to Colora-
do-sourced marijuana include housing, food, health care, transfer to-and-from court, counseling, 
clothing, and maintenance.” Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint, and Brief in Support 
at 26–27, Nebraska & Oklahoma v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 2015-144). 
 12 Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. at 1036 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For an article arguing 
states have a right to invoke the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to challenge neighboring states’ 
marijuana legalization, see generally Chad DeVeaux & Anne Mostad-Jensen, Fear and Loathing 
in Colorado: Invoking the Supreme Court’s State-Controversy Jurisdiction to Challenge the Mari-
juana-Legalization Experiment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1829 (2015). 
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This Article proposes that this conflict between state interests would 
not arise with a nationwide ban by a state on its citizens use of marijuana. 
Federal law continues to prohibit the possession, use, and distribution of 
marijuana in almost all cases. In order to avoid preemption, states authoriz-
ing marijuana use have carefully explained that they are not encouraging or 
promoting it—as a way to avoid having their laws declared invalid. Instead, 
the states are simply declining to criminalize marijuana. To the extent, then, 
that a state has the power to prohibit its citizens from using marijuana, it is 
pursuing a legitimate interest. By contrast, states “legalizing” marijuana are 
simply not taking a position. Accordingly, it is much more likely that the 
interests of the anti-marijuana state would be recognized as superior be-
cause they do not conflict with the interests and public policies of the states 
where marijuana is legal. By solving one inter-jurisdictional conflict—that 
between permissive state laws and federal marijuana prohibitions— decrim-
inalizing states undermined their position with respect to anti-marijuana 
states. 
Part I briefly discusses principles of criminal jurisdiction, including the 
rule that sovereigns may legislate with respect to their citizens extraterrito-
rially.13 To be sure, this sort of jurisdiction is exercised relatively infre-
quently; therefore, there are a limited number of cases. The cases suggest, 
however, that extraterritorial jurisdiction may not be recognized if it would 
interfere with the authority of the state where the conduct occurs.  
Part II examines one aspect of the conflicts created by inconsistent ma-
rijuana legislation.14 In a range of contexts, public and private actors have 
claimed that state medical marijuana laws were invalid because they were 
preempted by the federal marijuana ban in the CSA. Many state appellate 
courts rejected these claims, upholding the state laws, finding them con-
sistent with federal law because they do not authorize violations of federal 
law through encouraging, promoting, or requiring the use of marijuana. Ra-
ther, they merely withhold state criminal arrest, charge or punishment in 
particular circumstances, leaving the federal laws unimpaired. 
The success in avoiding preemption of state marijuana laws rests on 
the idea that the legalizing state has no position on marijuana; it is neutral. 
Nevertheless, if the state, say Colorado, is neutral on marijuana, then it is in 
no position to claim a public policy interests against another state, say Ne-
braska, who is attempting to enforce a national prohibition of its citizens’ 
use of marijuana. This jurisprudential solution of the vertical federalism 
(federal to state) problem has created problems for the solution of the hori-
zontal federalism (state to state) problem.   
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 15–42 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 43–86 and accompanying text. 
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States have yet to enact laws prohibiting and punishing their citizens’ 
extraterritorial use of marijuana. Should they choose to do so, the absence 
of conflict with the policy of other states makes it much more likely that 
such laws would be upheld. 
I. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
The usual basis for state criminal jurisdiction is territorial.15 States may 
criminalize and prosecute acts taking place within the boundaries of the state, 
but the territorial principle is not limited to situations where all, or even any, 
of the elements of the offense actually occur within the state.16 In addition, 
states can legislate when crimes have consequences within the state.17 
The Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, which are reasonably repre-
sentative, provide that “a person may be convicted under the law of this 
Commonwealth” if (1) “conduct which is an element of the offense or the 
result which is such an element occurs within” Pennsylvania;18 (2) out-of-
state conduct constitutes an attempt to commit a crime in Pennsylvania;19 
(3) out-of-state conduct constitutes a conspiracy to commit a crime in Penn-
sylvania, and an overt act occurs in the state;20 (4) conduct in Pennsylvania 
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit an offense out-
of-state, and the conduct is an offense in both jurisdictions;21 (5) out-of-
state conduct consists of an omission to perform a legal duty in Pennsylva-
nia; 22 and (6) the statute expressly applies out-of-state and “the conduct 
bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this Commonwealth 
and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Mass. 1999) (“The general rule, accepted as ‘axi-
omatic’ by the courts in this country, is that a State may not prosecute an individual for a crime 
committed outside its boundaries.”). See generally 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 4.4 (2d ed.), Westlaw 
(database updated Oct. 2016) (“State Jurisdiction”); 4 CRIM. PROC. § 16.4(c) (4th ed.), Westlaw 
(database updated Dec. 2016) (“State Jurisdiction”); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legis-
lative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEX. L. REV. 763 (1960) (discussing the “ex-
tent to which the criminal legislation of [a state] may be applied in the courts [outside of that state] 
to certain conduct, harm, or, perhaps, other factors occurring without the state”). 
 16 See People v. Betts, 103 P.3d 883, 887 (Cal. 2005) (“For example, a state may exercise 
jurisdiction over criminal acts that take place outside of the state if the results of the crime are 
intended to, and do, cause harm within the state.”). 
 17 See In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d at 610–11 (“The ‘effects’ doctrine provides that “[a]cts done 
outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a 
State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect.” (quoting Strass-
heim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)). 
 18 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102(a)(1) (1997). 
 19 Id. § 102(a)(2). 
 20 Id. § 102(a)(3). 
 21 Id. § 102(a)(4). 
 22 Id. § 102(a)(5). 
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interest.”23 The U.S. Supreme Court has generally approved exercise of ju-
risdiction of this sort, recognizing that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, 
but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a 
state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the ef-
fect.”24 
In addition to regulating conduct in or affecting its territory, there are 
other grounds for state exercise of jurisdiction.25 One important basis is the 
nationality or citizenship of the actor. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
this basis of jurisdiction in 1941 in Skiriotes v. Florida.26 Skiriotes was con-
victed of a marine violation off the shore of Florida, but contended that, 
based on federal law and international treaties, the conduct undisputedly 
occurred beyond Florida’s territorial waters and therefore out of its territori-
al jurisdiction.27 The Supreme Court held that because Skiriotes was a citi-
zen and resident of Florida, the statute could be applied extraterritorially.28 
The Court noted that “the United States is not debarred by any rule of inter-
national law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high 
seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their 
nationals are not infringed.”29 Because the states had authority similar to the 
United States, 
Even if it were assumed that the locus of the offense was outside 
the territorial waters of Florida, it would not follow that the State 
could not prohibit its own citizens from the use of the described 
divers’ equipment at that place. No question as to the authority of 
the United States over these waters . . . is here involved. No right 
of a citizen of any other State is here asserted. The question is 
solely between appellant and his own State.30 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. § 102(a)(6). 
 24 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). This is commonly known as the “effects” 
doctrine. See In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d at 610–11. The effects doctrine is “not dependent upon 
the existence of a jurisdictional statute explicitly providing for it.” Id. at 611; see, e.g., State v. 
Stepansky, 761 So. 2d 1027, 1037 (Fla. 2000) (upholding jurisdiction on sexual assault and bur-
glary on a ship which had departed from a Florida port; “individual states have been accorded 
wide latitude, by the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court and pertinent federal legisla-
tion, to assert concurrent jurisdiction over maritime criminal matters extending beyond the State’s 
territorial limits”); see also State v. Jack, 125 P.3d 311, 321 (Alaska 2005). 
 25 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 n.24 (2d Cir. 2003) (summarizing “five bases 
on which a State may exercise criminal jurisdiction over a citizen or non-citizen for acts commit-
ted outside of the prosecuting State”). 
 26 313 U.S. 69, 76–77 (1941). 
 27 Id. at 70, 75–76. 
 28 Id. at 72–73. 
 29 Id. at 73. 
 30 Id. at 76; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (“While it appears that the 
petitioner removed his residence to France in the year 1924, it is undisputed that he was, and con-
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Because there was no conflicting federal law, the statute impaired no rights 
of a non-Floridian, and Florida had a legitimate interest in the matter regu-
lated, Skiriotes could be subject to Florida’s law even if not in Florida.31 
On the other hand, states cannot regulate without regard to the authori-
ty of other states. In Nielsen v. Oregon, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated 
a state law to the extent that another state had a conflicting interest.32 Feder-
al law granted Oregon and Washington concurrent jurisdiction over the Co-
lumbia River.33 Washington issued its resident Christ Nielsen a license to 
fish using a purse net in the Columbia, but Oregon law prohibited the use of 
purse nets and prosecuted Nielsen.34 The Supreme Court framed the case as 
presenting the question: 
Can the state of Oregon, by virtue of its concurrent jurisdiction, 
disregard that authority, practically override the legislation of 
Washington, and punish a man for doing within the territorial lim-
its of Washington an act which that state had specially authorized 
him to do? We are of opinion that it cannot.35 
Oregon had territorial jurisdiction, yet, that jurisdiction could not be exer-
cised because Nielsen and Washington had interests that also had to be con-
sidered.36 If Nielsen had been a citizen of Oregon, or if Washington had not 
enacted a conflicting law, perhaps the case would have come out differently. 
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States similarly recognizes that a state may regulate “the activities, interests, 
                                                                                                                           
tinued to be, a citizen of the United States. He continued to owe allegiance to the United States. 
By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him, and he 
was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign country.”). 
 31 Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 78–79. But see United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 216 (4th Cir. 
2015) (“Requiring a showing of demonstrable effect, of course, still requires that the effect be 
more than merely imaginable or hypothetical. A prohibition on littering in Istanbul, for instance, 
may not pass constitutional muster.”); State v. Sterling, 448 A.2d 785, 787 (R.I. 1982) (“Rhode 
Island’s interest in preventing the depletion of the nearby yellowtail flounder population is suffi-
ciently strong to justify extraterritorial enforcement of a regulation . . . . Upon examining the his-
tory of federal fishing legislation and the regulations promulgated thereunder, we find, however, 
that the Rhode Island regulation conflicts with federal policies governing yellowtail flounder and 
is therefore invalid.”). 
 32 212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909). 
 33 Id. at 319. 
 34 Id. at 316. 
 35 Id. at 321. 
 36 Nevertheless, when there was no conflict with Washington law, Oregon could prosecute 
purse net fishing in the area of concurrent jurisdiction. State v. Catholic, 147 P. 372, 378 (Or. 
1915) (“Thus it appears that the act charged is condemned alike by the laws of Oregon and of 
Washington. There is no grant of authority for it by the latter state. Our sister commonwealth 
having promulgated a rule on the subject which measurably conforms to our own, the defendant 
cannot claim immunity through any lack of legislation on either side of the boundary.”). 
936 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:929 
status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.”37 
The Restatement, however, precludes extraterritorial regulation when it is 
“unreasonable,” and factors considered in evaluating reasonableness include 
“the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity” and “the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.”38 
As in Nielsen, it may be that jurisdiction in a particular case may not be ex-
ercised if another state has a superior interest in application of some differ-
ent rule. Based on these principles, courts considering whether U.S. law 
applies to foreign conduct often evaluate whether the command of U.S. law 
will conflict with a foreign rule.39 One common context is § 2423(c), pro-
hibiting U.S. nationals and permanent residents from engaging in certain 
sexual conduct with minors overseas.40 Cases upholding prosecutions often 
note that the conduct is prohibited in the place of prosecution as well as by 
                                                                                                                           
 37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
There are eight factors in total: 
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to 
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and 
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, 
residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person princi-
pally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those 
whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be 
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which 
other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such 
regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of justified expectations that 
might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to 
the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the reg-
ulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to 
which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the like-
lihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
Id. § 403(2); see also United States v. Flath, No. 11-CR-69, 2011 WL 6299941, at *10 (E.D. Wis. 
Sept. 14, 2011), report and recommendation adopted in part, 845 F. Supp. 2d 951 (E.D. Wis. 
2012). 
 38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(g)–(h) (AM. LAW INST. 
1987); see also Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extra-
territorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 119 (2010) (proposing a “dual-
illegality rule [which] would require that U.S. courts decline to interpret geoambiguous laws to 
penalize or regulate conduct that occurs in the territory of another state unless the same conduct is 
also illegal or similarly regulated by the law of the foreign territorial state”). 
 39 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld application of U.S. intellectual property laws to miscon-
duct occurring in Mexico, noting that “Mexico’s courts have nullified the Mexican registration of 
‘Bulova’; there is thus no conflict which might afford petitioner a pretext that such relief would 
impugn foreign law.” Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952). 
 40 18 U.S.C.A. § 2423(c) (West 2015) (“Any United States citizen or alien admitted for per-
manent residence who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either temporarily or permanently, 
in a foreign country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”). 
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U.S. law.41 Similarly, an important international parental kidnapping prece-
dent upheld a prosecution in an opinion noting that “there is no showing 
that Iranian law specifically authorizes defendant’s conduct in this case, that 
is to say that Iranian law ignores custody orders of another country and spe-
cifically authorizes the kidnapping that took place.”42 Accordingly, in eval-
uating whether an extraterritorial statute applicable to citizens is permissi-
ble, an important consideration is whether it conflicts with the law of the 
jurisdiction where the conduct occurs, by requiring conduct which is pro-
hibited or prohibiting conduct which is required or permitted. Put another 
way, when one jurisdiction has territorial jurisdiction over an individual, 
and another has citizen jurisdiction, when the laws are inconsistent, the laws 
of only one jurisdiction can prevail and the law weighs the interests of both.  
II. CITIZEN JURISDICTION WHEN STATE LAWS CONFLICT 
Scholars rather than courts have elaborately explored the extent of ju-
risdiction based on citizenship in the context of reproductive rights. A num-
ber of authors have addressed the consequences of overruling or limiting 
Roe v. Wade.43 Some states would likely still recognize reproductive rights 
by statute, whereas others would likely impose sharp limitations or absolute 
                                                                                                                           
 41 United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[N]othing suggests that 
Cambodia objected in any way to Clark’s extradition and trial under U.S. law.”); United States v. 
Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 802 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (“This crime is also illegal in Mexico, both 
under Mexican federal law, and the laws of the state of Chihuahua. Defendant has therefore failed 
to demonstrate any likelihood of conflict with Mexico that would exist if the United States regu-
lates this activity.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Frank, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359–60 
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Mr. Frank argues that § 2423(c) is unconstitutional because it fails to recognize 
the domestic law of Cambodia, which provides that the age of consent is 15 . . . . As an initial 
matter, § 2423(c) does not regulate the conduct of Cambodian nationals . . . . In addition, . . . 
Cambodia, notwithstanding its own domestic laws on consent, and because of a concern over the 
impact of child sex tourism, decided as a nation that it would sign an international agreement 
requiring countries to enact legislation to forbid commercial sex with those under the age of 18 by 
their own nationals. If Cambodia does not believe that the Optional Protocol infringes on its sov-
ereignty—and it obviously does not—it will not be offended by laws enacted by the United States 
to implement the Optional Protocol, which regulate the conduct of American citizens abroad.”); 
see also United States v. Clarke, 159 F. App’x 128, 130 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[E]ven if Clarke were 
correct that the Government was required to show the prostitution in question is illegal in Costa 
Rica, both Agent Patterson and Detective Love testified it is illegal to engage in prostitution with a 
minor in Costa Rica.”). 
 42 United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d 723, 731 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 43 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and 
the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 873 (1993) (“The question then arises whether one state 
can apply its law to abortions that have connections with other states. In particular, a state that 
outlaws abortions might attempt to prohibit its residents from traveling to states where abortions 
are legal and terminating their pregnancies there.”). 
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prohibitions.44 Important examples include a set of papers written by Seth F. 
Kreimer arguing that “the text, history, structure, and practice of American 
federalism . . . weigh heavily against the extraterritorial assertion of moral-
ism to punish actions that take place on the soil of and with the permission 
of sister states.” 45 Mark Rosen has offered thoughtful rejoinders arguing 
that states could regulate their citizens’ ability to obtain abortions out of 
state.46 
A key disputed text is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bigelow v. 
Virginia,47 which concluded that Virginia could not prohibit the advertise-
ment, in Virginia media outlets, of abortion services available in New York. 
After noting that Virginia could not directly regulate abortion or abortion 
providers in New York, the Court stated: 
Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from traveling to New 
York to obtain those services or, as the State conceded, prosecute 
them for going there. Virginia possessed no authority to regulate 
the services provided in New York—the skills and credentials of 
the New York physicians and of the New York professionals who 
assisted them, the standards of the New York hospitals and clinics 
to which patients were referred, or the practices and charges of 
the New York referral services. A State does not acquire power or 
supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely be-
                                                                                                                           
 44 See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federalism Doctrines and Abortion Cases: A Response to Pro-
fessor Fallon, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 767, 768 (2007) (assessing how the “Court might resolve con-
stitutional questions of federal-state authority”); C. Steven Bradford, What Happens if Roe Is 
Overruled? Extraterritorial Regulation of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87, 91 (1993) 
(examining whether a “state [could] prohibit its residents from leaving the state to obtain a legal 
abortion elsewhere”); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Abortion Across State Lines, 2008 BYU L. REV. 
1651, 1654–55 (concluding that “states can apply their laws to their citizens when they travel out 
of the state in an effort to avoid abortion restrictions”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Over-
ruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611, 611 (2007) 
(examining the legal and policy considerations at the state and federal level if Roe v. Wade were 
overturned). 
 45 Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 1017 (2002); see also Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of 
Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 451 (1992). 
 46 See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federal-
ism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 945 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Het-
erogeneity]; Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1133, 1155 (2010) (“And so long as Congress does not act, federal courts and even the states 
themselves can take the initiative in determining the scope of states’ extraterritorial powers.”); see 
also Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1865, 1912–13 (1987) (arguing that states could regulate extraterritorial abortions by their citi-
zens). 
 47 421 U.S. 809, 811, 829 (1975). 
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cause the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected 
when they travel to that State . . . . [I]t may not, under the guise of 
exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State 
from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in 
that State.48 
Bigelow cited Doe v. Bolton, which contains this passage: 
Just as the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Const. Art. IV, § 2, 
protects persons who enter other States to ply their trade, so must 
it protect persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical services 
that are available there. A contrary holding would mean that a 
State could limit to its own residents the general medical care 
available within its borders. This we could not approve.49 
On one reading, because what was at issue was a constitutional right to 
terminate a pregnancy, these cases do nothing more than limit the right of 
states to restrict constitutionally protected activities.50 If that view is correct, 
overruling Roe would mean these cases would say nothing about whether 
Virginia could “prevent its residents from travelling to New York to obtain 
those services.” 51  Alternatively, perhaps Bigelow forbids “extraterritorial 
regulation of conduct legal where it occurs,”52 and therefore overruling Roe 
would be irrelevant—citizens of any state could still travel to New York for 
legal abortions notwithstanding the law of their state. 
 Supportive of the latter reading is that the Court’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause precedents, which suggest that states have no authority to directly 
regulate commercial transactions in other states: the “Commerce Clause . . . 
precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place 
wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has ef-
fects within the State.”53 One reason for this is respect for “the legitimate 
regulatory regimes of other States . . . . Generally speaking, the Commerce 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 822–25 (citations omitted). 
 49 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (citations omitted). 
 50 Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity, supra note 46, at 895–96 (“Any 
such limitation on extraterritoriality is immaterial to the regulations that are the subject of this 
Article, namely, laws that regulate activities that are not constitutionally protected . . . .”). 
 51 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824. 
 52 Seth F. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . . ”: The Right to Travel and Extra-
territorial Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907, 938 n.67 (1993). 
 53 Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 
U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982) (plurality opinion)); see also Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 
F.3d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (invalidating state law applicable to out of state transac-
tions, even as applied to citizens of enacting state); Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 
F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Healy is consistent with a long line of cases that considered 
whether state laws violated the Commerce Clause by regulating or controlling commerce occur-
ring wholly outside the legislating state.”). 
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Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection 
of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.”54 
The more compelling argument is that States have very limited power 
to regulate conduct authorized in other states, even by their own citizens. 
There is a danger of inconsistent regulation. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the states have broad “police powers,”55 and, pursuant to them, 
may promote health and morals “of the people.”56 Accordingly, to take the 
example of the Bigelow case, New York had an interest in allowing a visitor 
to its territory to obtain medical services, regardless of whether those ser-
vices are available or lawful elsewhere. The immediate economic and per-
sonal consequences of prohibition or permission occur in New York—New 
York, and a person physically present in New York, are prevented from pur-
suing a desired transaction. In addition, a temporary visitor who is a citizen 
of Virginia may become a permanent resident of New York. Also, if the 
concern warranting regulation is the moral effect in Virginia of a returned 
traveler who did something contrary to its public policy, there is also at least 
an equal and arguably greater moral effect in New York of people being 
denied the right to pursue their preferences that are legal under state law. 
Under the police power, New York has a right to instantiate in law the idea 
that human beings are entitled to self-determination. The immediate and 
certain impairment of the interests of the jurisdiction where the conduct oc-
curs trumps the contingent, uncertain impairment of the interests of some 
other place. For these reasons, Bigelow means precisely what it says, and, in 
general, the public policy of the territory where the transaction occurs (or 
does not) will normally prevail over the public policy of another state even 
if it has a legitimate interest and a basis to claim jurisdiction.  
If that is correct, however, the question of regulation of marijuana sale 
and use is not answered. To avoid federal preemption, the states allowing 
marijuana use have insisted that they are not pro-marijuana; they simply do 
not regulate the area. They are neutral. 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Healy, 491 U.S. at 336–37; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 
(1996) (“[I]t is clear that no single State could . . . impose its own policy choice on neighboring 
States.”). 
 55 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 560–61 (1991) (“The States’ traditional 
police power is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals, and 
such a basis for legislation has been upheld.”). 
 56 See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884) (recognizing “the power of the state, 
sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, 
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the 
state, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity”).   
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The federal CSA prohibits all medical and recreational uses of mariju-
ana.57 It also expressly allows state regulation of controlled substances, so 
long as that regulation is not fatally inconsistent with federal law. The pro-
vision addressing preemption, § 903, states: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating 
an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which 
that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclu-
sion of any State law on the same subject matter which would 
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a 
positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and 
that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.58 
Section 903 would not prohibit a nationwide prohibition on citizen use of 
marijuana, because there would be no positive conflict with federal law. The 
section does not, however, purport to authorize state regulation beyond that 
“which would otherwise be within the authority of the state.”59 Although 
production and use of marijuana is commerce subject to federal regula-
tion,60 a Commerce Clause objection to national jurisdiction over citizens of 
a state is diminished or entirely eliminated because of marijuana’s contra-
band nature under federal law. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, 
recently observed, “Where legitimate commerce is not burdened by a state 
law, the doctrine of the dormant commerce clause is inapplicable.”61 From 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amend-
ed at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–906(2012)). 
In the case of the Controlled Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that 
marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (outside the confines of a 
Government-approved research project). Whereas some other drugs can be dis-
pensed and prescribed for medical use, see 21 U.S.C. § 829, the same is not true for 
marijuana. Indeed, for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has “no 
currently accepted medical use” at all. 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001). 
 58 21 U.S.C. § 903. See generally Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 9–16 (2013) (giving general background on 
preemption law under the CSA).  
 59 21 U.S.C. § 903. 
 60 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2005). 
 61 State v. Alangcas, 345 P.3d 181, 202 (Haw. 2015) (citing People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 
133 (N.Y. 2000)); see also Predka v. Iowa, 186 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Predka’s Com-
merce Clause argument must fail because the marijuana was contraband, that is, property that is 
unlawful to possess, and as such not an object of interstate trade protected by the Commerce 
Clause.” (citing Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 139 (1939) and Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 
U.S. 47, 60 (1891))); People v. Boles, 280 P.3d 55, 62–63 (Colo. App. 2011) (finding no violation 
of dormant commerce clause because no “legitimate commerce” at issue); Cashatt v. State, 873 
So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (same); State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431, 438 (N.D. 
2003) (same).  
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the federal perspective, marijuana production and sales are not legitimate 
commerce even if licensed by a state. Therefore, the dormant Commerce 
Clause would not restrict a state from regulating its citizens’ extraterritorial 
possession and use of marijuana.  
There still remains the question, however, of balancing the territorial 
interests of the decriminalizing states against the interests of a state impos-
ing a national ban on marijuana use by its citizens.62 What is the nature of 
the interest and what is the public policy sought to be advanced by a de-
criminalizing state? On the one hand, the states cannot be required to crimi-
nalize marijuana; because of the anti-commandeering principle of Printz v. 
United States,63 Congress could not force the states to lend their officers or 
courts to the anti-marijuana project. 
On the other hand, states cannot overrule valid federal laws. For better 
or worse, the Supreme Court has upheld a broad congressional authority to 
prohibit marijuana in the entire United States. If a state were to enact a law 
providing, in effect, “[n]otwithstanding the federal Controlled Substances 
Act, marijuana is legal, and may be possessed, transported, cultivated and 
distributed by adults in this state without state or federal penalty,” undoubt-
edly it would be preempted by § 903 because there would be “a positive 
conflict” so profound that “the two cannot consistently stand together.”64  
 For example, in a 2010 decision, the Oregon Supreme Court, in Emer-
ald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, held that federal 
law preempted a state law allowing the distribution and use of medical ma-
                                                                                                                           
 62 The police power has been held sufficient to warrant marijuana prohibition. State v. Dee, 
39 A.3d 42, 43 (Me. 2012) (“There is a rational explanation for the Legislature’s decision to pro-
scribe the possession of marijuana.”); Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 622 (Wash. 1997) (“Thus, art. 
I, § 32 was not meant to provide a substantive right to use marijuana for medical treatment free 
from the lawful exercise of government police power.”). Professor Regan used regulation of intox-
icants as an example of a situation where extraterritorial regulation might be desirable. Although 
objecting to restrictions on interstate access to abortion services, he stated: 
We ought to observe, however, that it is possible to imagine considerably more 
sympathetic uses of a state power to legislate extraterritorially for its own citizens 
than any we have yet discussed. For example, suppose that Illinois tried to preserve 
its drinking age of twenty-one by forbidding underage Illinoisans from drinking in 
Wisconsin. Aside from difficulties of enforcement, such a law would have much to 
recommend it, both as an attempt to minimize drunk driving in Illinois by Illinois 
teenagers returning from out-of-state adventures, and as part of an attempt by the 
state to oversee its young citizens’ developing relationship with a powerful, and om-
nipresent, drug. 
Regan, supra note 46, at 1912–13. 
 63 See 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997) (holding that the federal government cannot commandeer 
“state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun 
purchasers and to perform certain related tasks”). 
 64 See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
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rijuana.65 An employee with a medical marijuana card was fired by an em-
ployer for his use of marijuana outside of work.66 The employee sued based 
on the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act and state employment discrimination 
law, insisting that he had a disability and was using a drug that was lawful 
under Oregon law.67 The majority held that the employee was properly dis-
charged: 
Affirmatively authorizing a use that federal law prohibits stands 
as an obstacle to the implementation and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of the Controlled Substances Act. To be 
sure, state law does not prevent the federal government from en-
forcing its marijuana laws against medical marijuana users in Or-
egon if the federal government chooses to do so. But the state law 
at issue in Michigan Canners [and Freezers Association v. Agri-
cultural Marketing and Bargaining Board, 467 U.S. 461 (1984)] 
did not prevent the federal government from seeking injunctive 
and other relief to enforce the federal prohibition in that case. Ra-
ther, state law stood as an obstacle to the enforcement of federal 
law in Michigan Canners because state law affirmatively author-
ized the very conduct that federal law prohibited, as it does in this 
case. To the extent that ORS 475.306(1) affirmatively authorizes 
the use of medical marijuana, federal law preempts that subsec-
tion, leaving it “without effect.”68 
Perhaps recognizing the force of the argument that affirmative action 
by a state on marijuana would be preempted by the CSA, numerous appel-
late cases have concluded that the state regulation or action was a mere 
withholding of criminalization or prosecution, rather than affirmative en-
couragement, promotion, authorization or permission. In several contexts, 
described below, state courts have explained their interest in marijuana as 
neutral non-regulation. 
Probation Conditions. Probation conditions typically require a proba-
tioner to obey all laws, state and federal. Yet, at least California69 and Ari-
                                                                                                                           
 65 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or. 2010). 
 66 Id. at 520–21. 
 67 Id. at 521. 
 68Id. at 529 (citations omitted) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 
(1992)); see also Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prod., Inc., 134 P.3d 161, 167 (Or. 2006) (Kistler, 
J., concurring) (“The difficulty with plaintiff’s argument, in my view, is that federal law preempts 
the state employment discrimination statute to the extent that it requires defendant to accommo-
date plaintiff’s medical marijuana use.”). 
 69 See People v. Tilehkooh, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 226, 235–36 (Ct. App. 2003) (“Since the state 
does not punish a violation of the federal law “as such,” it can only reach conduct subject to the 
federal criminal law by incorporating the conduct into the state law. The People do not claim they 
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zona have declined to make marijuana use in violation of federal law but in 
compliance with state law a ground for a probation violation. The Arizona 
Supreme Court explained why this was not preempted: 
By not including a prohibition against AMMA-compliant mariju-
ana use, or in this case by removing the condition upon [the pro-
bationer’s] request, the trial court would not be authorizing or 
sanctioning a violation of federal law, but rather would be recog-
nizing that the court’s authority to impose probation conditions is 
limited by statute.70 
Arizona is not authorizing a crime, it has simply abandoned the regulatory 
arena. 
Issuance of Identification or Licenses; Taxation. In 2008, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal rejected a claim by San Diego County that a state law 
requiring it to issue medical marijuana identification cards was preempted 
by the CSA.71 The court concluded: 
The identification laws obligate a county only to process applica-
tions for, maintain records of, and issue cards to, those individuals 
entitled to claim the exemption. The CSA is entirely silent on the 
ability of states to provide identification cards to their citizenry, 
and an entity that issues identification cards does not engage in 
conduct banned by the CSA. 
 Counties appear to argue there is a positive conflict between 
the identification laws and the CSA because the card issued by a 
county confirms that its bearer may violate or is immunized from 
federal laws. However, the applications for the card expressly 
state the card will not insulate the bearer from federal laws, and 
the card itself does not imply the holder is immune from prosecu-
tion for federal offenses; instead, the card merely identifies those 
persons California has elected to exempt from California’s sanc-
tions. (Cf. U.S. v. Cannabis Cultivators Club (N.D.Cal.1998) 5 
F.Supp.2d 1086, 1100 [California’s CUA “does not conflict with 
                                                                                                                           
are enforcing a federal criminal sanction attached to the federal marijuana law. Rather, they seek 
to enforce the state sanction of probation revocation which is solely a creature of state law. 
(§ 1203.2.) The state cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. That is what it seeks to do in 
revoking probation when it cannot punish the defendant under the criminal law . . . . California 
courts do not enforce the federal marijuana possession laws when defendants prosecuted for mari-
juana possession have a qualified immunity under section 11362.5. Similarly, California courts 
should not enforce federal marijuana law for probationers who qualify for the immunity provided 
by section 11362.5.”). 
 70 Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 347 P.3d 136, 141 (Ariz. 2015). 
 71 Cty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 481 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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federal law because on its face it does not purport to make legal 
any conduct prohibited by federal law; it merely exempts certain 
conduct by certain persons from the California drug laws”].) Be-
cause the CSA law does not compel the states to impose criminal 
penalties for marijuana possession, the requirement that counties 
issue cards identifying those against whom California has opted 
not to impose criminal penalties does not positively conflict with 
the CSA.72 
California courts have also rejected claims that laws providing for govern-
ment participation in marijuana regulation are preempted.73 
On similar reasoning, the Washington Court of Appeals rejected a 
claim that taxation of marijuana enterprises was preempted: 
DOR’s tax assessments on collective gardens indicate that it is 
aware of the medical marijuana market, but that is not the same as 
promoting or condoning the market. It is well-established that 
states have authority to tax illegal activities. DOR’s tax assess-
ments did not cause Nickerson to grow, possess, and distribute 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id.; see also id. at 482 (“Congress does not have the authority to compel the states to direct 
their law enforcement personnel to enforce federal laws.”). 
 73 In City of Palm Springs v. Luna Crest Inc., a marijuana dispensary claimed that a city’s 
regulations were federally preempted: 
Luna articulates no persuasive reason why the City’s regulatory program for medical 
marijuana should be considered to stand as an obstacle to the purposes and objec-
tives of Congress. “Congress enacted the [Controlled Substances Act] to combat 
recreational drug abuse and curb drug trafficking.” (City of Garden Grove v. Supe-
rior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 355, 383, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 656.) Nothing about the 
City’s regulatory program for medical marijuana stands in the way of those purpos-
es. (See [Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 107 (Ct. 
App. 2010)] [rejecting argument that state medical marijuana laws are preempted 
under obstacle preemption].) To the contrary, common sense suggests that a strong 
local regulatory regime governing medical marijuana related conduct would tend to 
prevent the transformation of purported nonprofit medical marijuana dispensaries in-
to “profiteering enterprises” that contribute to recreational drug abuse and drug traf-
ficking. 
200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 132–33 (Ct. App. 2016) (first and third alterations in original); see also 
Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 106–07 (“The city does not explain how any of the 
state law decriminalization provisions of the CUA or the MMPA create a positive conflict with 
federal law, so that it is impossible to comply with both federal and state laws. A claim of positive 
conflict might gain more traction if the state required, instead of merely exempting from state 
criminal prosecution, individuals to possess, cultivate, transport, possess for sale, or sell medical 
marijuana in a manner that violated federal law. But because neither the CUA or the MMPA re-
quire such conduct, there is no ‘positive conflict’ with federal law, as contemplated for preemption 
under the CSA. (21 U.S.C. § 903.)”); cf. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 368 P.3d 1131, 
1138 (Mont. 2016) (evaluating and largely upholding medical marijuana statute, noting “no chal-
lenge is brought to the Act on the ground that it is preempted by federal law, U.S. Const. art. VI, 
cl. 2, and the State expressly disclaimed such a challenge during oral argument”). 
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medical marijuana. Rather, DOR imposed taxes on Nickerson be-
cause he had distributed medical marijuana in exchange for other 
items of value. The taxes came after the fact.  
 In addition, the CSA is concerned with the supply and demand 
of classified drugs and therefore seeks to control the “distribution, 
dispensing, and possession” of classified drugs. It is hard to see 
how the DOR’s tax assessments would disturb the CSA’s ability 
to regulate the distribution, dispensing, or possession of marijua-
na. Further, DOR’s tax assessments do not impede federal prose-
cution for CSA violations. Federal authorities are free to enforce 
the CSA in an effort to effectuate the purposes and objectives of 
the law—to control drug trafficking and the supply and demand 
for classified drugs. 
 Accordingly, we hold that DOR’s application of retail sales and 
B & O taxes to collective gardens’ “sales” of medical marijuana 
does not create an obstacle to the execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of the CSA.74 
The brief for the United States in Nebraska v. Colorado likewise reasoned 
that state regulation is more likely to control undesirable dissemination of 
marijuana than naked decriminalization.75 
Invalidating Anti-marijuana Local Zoning. It may be that prohibiting 
anti-marijuana probation conditions or government participation in mariju-
ana regulation or taxation do not promote marijuana cultivation or use. 
Some court decisions seem to immunize conduct that is closer to direct en-
couragement or violation of federal law. The Michigan Supreme Court 
found that a local zoning ordinance prohibiting land use in violation of fed-
eral law was preempted by the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act 
(“MMMA”), which prohibited penalties on use of marijuana permitted by 
state law.76 The court held that the MMMA was also not preempted by fed-
eral law. 
Section 4(a) [of the MMMA] simply provides that, under state 
law, certain individuals may engage in certain medical marijuana 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Nickerson v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, No. 48702-1-II, 2016 WL 6599651, at *5–6 
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2016) (citations omitted).   
 75 The brief noted that the states “do not allege that Colorado has directed or authorized any 
individual to transport marijuana into their territories in violation of their laws,” or that “the CSA 
requires Colorado to prohibit the sale or possession of marijuana.” Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 14, 17, Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 2015-
144). “If plaintiffs were to prevail, therefore, the result might be that Colorado’s regulatory regime 
would be enjoined but the sale and possession of marijuana would still be lawful under Colorado’s 
laws.” Id. at 17.  
 76 Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 537–38, 541 (Mich. 2014). 
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use without risk of penalty. As previously discussed, while such 
use is prohibited under federal law, § 4(a) does not deny the fed-
eral government the ability to enforce that prohibition, nor does it 
purport to require, authorize, or excuse its violation. Granting Ter 
Beek his requested relief does not limit his potential exposure to 
federal enforcement of the CSA against him, but only recognizes 
that he is immune under state law for MMMA-compliant conduct, 
as provided in § 4(a) . . . . [T]he state law here does not frustrate 
or impede the federal mandate.77 
With all due respect to a unanimous court, striking down a local prohibition, 
so that acts in violation of federal law can occur, arguably does impede the 
federal mandate. 
Return of Seized Marijuana. Appellate courts in several states have 
held that local police officers are required to return seized marijuana to the 
owner if it was possessed in accordance with state law. In an opinion citing 
similar cases from California and Oregon, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
noted that police officers had no risk of federal prosecution, because 
[F]ederal law immunizes a law enforcement official from liability 
under circumstances such as these. Title 21, section 885(d) of the 
United States Code is titled “Immunity of Federal, State, local 
and other officials” and provides that, with exceptions not rele-
vant here, “no civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue 
of this subchapter . . . upon any duly authorized officer of any 
State, territory, political subdivision thereof . . . who shall be law-
fully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordi-
nance relating to controlled substances.” 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). This 
provision immunizes law enforcement officers such as the Sheriff 
from any would-be federal prosecution for complying with a 
court order to return [the claimant’s] marijuana to her.78 
The Colorado Supreme Court, 4-3, recently disagreed.79 
Issue Pistol Permit. Federal law prohibits a person who “is an unlaw-
ful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” from receiving or pos-
sessing a firearm, and prohibits licensed dealers from selling to such a per-
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. at 540. 
 78 State v. Okun, 296 P.3d 998, 1001–02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (citing City of Garden Grove 
v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 681 (Ct. App. 2007)); State v. Kama, 39 P.3d 866, 868 
(Or. Ct. App. 2002)). But see State v. Ehrensing, 296 P.3d 1279, 1284 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (refus-
ing to order return of marijuana under circumstances). 
 79 People v. Crouse, 2017 CO 5, ¶¶ 18–19 (388 P.3d 39) (Colo. 2017). 
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son. 80 The Ninth Circuit recently upheld an administrative ruling that a 
medical marijuana card-holder could not purchase a firearm from a federal 
firearms licensee.81 Conversely, the Oregon Supreme Court, unanimously, 
just a year after its decision in Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc., rejected a 
suit by Oregon sheriffs seeking to avoid issuance to Concealed Handgun 
Licenses to applicants who admitted to having Oregon medical marijuana 
cards. 82 Though recognizing that federal law prohibited marijuana users 
from possessing firearms, the court concluded that issuance of permits 
would not frustrate the federal purpose: 
Does ORS 166.291, which requires county sheriffs to issue CHLs 
to qualified applicants even if they use marijuana in violation of 
federal law, stand as an obstacle to the full accomplishment and ex-
ercise of the federal firearms statute’s purpose? The sheriffs con-
tend that it does, because it allows marijuana users—persons who 
are deemed by Congress to be unqualified to possess firearms—to 
obtain licenses that effectively authorize their possession of fire-
arms. But . . . that contention does not accurately reflect the actual 
terms of the CHL statute. Putting aside the question of whether the 
CHL statute affirmatively “authorizes” anything, the fact remains 
that the statute is not directly concerned with the possession of fire-
arms, but with the concealment of firearms in specified locations—
on one’s person or in one’s car . . . . Neither is the statute an obsta-
cle to Congress’s purposes in the sense that it interferes with the 
ability of the federal government to enforce the policy that the Gun 
Control Act expresses. A marijuana user’s possession of a CHL 
may exempt him or her from prosecution or arrest under ORS 
166.250(1)(a) and (b), but it does not in any way preclude full en-
forcement of the federal law by federal law enforcement officials.83 
Again, the court insisted that the permit was an exemption from prosecu-
tion, not an affirmative authorization for conduct prohibited by federal law. 
                                                                                                                           
 80 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), (g)(3) (2012). Although the prohibitions apply only to receipt or 
possession “in or affecting commerce,” “the interstate commerce nexus requirement of the posses-
sion offense [is] satisfied by proof that the firearm petitioner possessed had previously traveled in 
interstate commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 566 (1977). Normally, this is 
shown by demonstrating that the firearm at any point crossed a state or national border. United 
States v. Bass, 325 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming where “the gun had been manufac-
tured in California and shipped to Illinois”); United States v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555, 564 (9th Cir. 
1996) (affirming where, although firearm was manufactured and found in California, it had been 
temporarily stored in a “Nevada gun warehouse, then shipped to a California gun dealer”). 
 81 Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, Wilson v. 
Lynch (Jan. 27, 2017) (No. 16-951). 
 82 Willis v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058, 1065–66 (Or. 2011). 
 83 Id. 
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“The state’s decision not to use its gun licensing mechanism [to enforce] 
federal law does not pose an obstacle to the enforcement of that law. Feder-
al officials can effectively enforce the federal prohibition on gun possession 
by marijuana users by arresting . . . those who violate it.”84 
 State lawyers and state courts had no choice but to minimize the state 
interests behind these laws. These state actions on their face seem to facili-
tate the use and distribution of marijuana, at least in particular circumstanc-
es, in violation of the CSA. One might assume that they in fact rest on a 
public policy judgment that medical marijuana has legitimate uses, and in 
such cases, use should be encouraged, that availability of marijuana pro-
motes the welfare and morals of the people, and raises revenue for the state. 
In the face of a flat federal prohibition, however, arguing that the laws pro-
moted marijuana use would have been fatal, almost certainly resulting in 
preemption. Accordingly, the statutes from preemption under the CSA by 
insisting that all the laws were doing, their sole function, is withholding 
penalties in particular circumstances. As the Supreme Court of California 
explained, “No state law could completely legalize marijuana for medical 
purposes because the drug remains illegal under federal law, even for medi-
cal users. Instead of attempting the impossible . . . California’s voters mere-
ly exempted medical users and their primary caregivers from criminal lia-
bility under two specifically designated state statutes.”85 
As a result, recreational and medical marijuana states, or visitors to 
them, would be in a weak position to challenge a prohibition on using mari-
juana promulgated by another state with respect to its citizens. In Oregon v. 
Nielsen, Washington affirmatively authorized certain conduct that it has a 
right to promote, and that permission overrode contrary law of Oregon, ap-
plied in an Oregon court;86 both states had jurisdiction, but Washington had 
a superior interest. Marijuana use is more like conduct occurring on the 
high seas because there is no other state with jurisdiction that has an affirm-
ative state policy to permit, encourage, or facilitate marijuana use to balance 
against the policy interests of the prohibiting state. 
CONCLUSION 
As it happens, states of the United States generally do not regulate the 
conduct of their citizens on a nationwide or international basis.87 In particu-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Id. at 1066. 
 85 Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 86 212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909). 
 87 Oregon is a partial exception. It provides for juvenile court jurisdiction based on “an act 
that is a violation, or that if done by an adult would constitute a violation, of a law or ordinance of 
the United States or a state, county or city.” OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.005(1) (2015); see State ex 
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lar, research reveals no state expressly prohibiting citizens from using mari-
juana in another state. A number of considerations explain why states have 
not more vigorously regulated their citizens extraterritorially. One is respect 
for the interests of other states in a federal system. Another is that states 
may be persuaded that criminal problems at home are more important and 
can be more readily and efficiently addressed. States may reason that extra-
territorial regulation is likely to be arbitrary and ineffective, given that, for 
example, Oklahoma and Nebraska do not have large detachments of police 
investigators stationed in Denver.  
Both Nebraska and Oklahoma have broad jurisdictional statutes that 
suggest a test is possible. The Nebraska Supreme Court, considering a con-
spiracy statute, held in 1975 that “[a] conspiracy in this state to do some-
thing in another state which is lawful in that state is not a crime in this state. 
A conspiracy in Nebraska to gamble in Nevada is a convenient illustration 
of that principle.”88 The court, however, noted that “[t]he problem that is 
presented by this case is one that can be solved by legislation.”89 The Ne-
braska Legislature seemingly “solved” that problem for gambling when 
they substantially revised their gambling statute90 in 1986 to provide that 
“[i]t shall be no defense to a prosecution under any provision of this article 
relating to gambling that the gambling is conducted outside this state and is 
not in violation of the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is conducted.”91 
Although there are no reported cases interpreting this section, it can plausi-
bly be read as applying, to the extent that it constitutionally can, to extrater-
ritorial conduct of citizens of Nebraska.92 If Nebraska believes it is appro-
priate to regulate gambling in states where it is legal, it might consider regu-
lating drug use extraterritorially as well. 
Oklahoma law possibly already permits prosecution for its citizens 
who use drugs out of state. In cases dealing with alcohol prohibition, older 
                                                                                                                           
rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. W., 578 P.2d 824, 827 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting equal protection chal-
lenge to provision). 
 88 State v. Karsten, 231 N.W.2d 335, 336 (Neb. 1975); see also, e.g., People v. Cox, 486 
N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (“[A]n agreement contrived in New York to operate a gam-
bling establishment in Nevada, where such conduct is not criminal or even illegal, is not prosecut-
able as a conspiracy in New York . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 89 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.1104 (2015) (“(1) A person commits the offense of promoting gam-
bling in the third degree if he or she knowingly participates in unlawful gambling as a player by 
betting less than five hundred dollars in any one day. (2) Promoting gambling in the third degree is 
a Class IV misdemeanor.”). See generally Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming 
Law, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1123 (1996) (describing Nebraska state gaming law). 
 90 Nebraska currently prohibits gambling, including being a player. See Karsten, 231 N.W.2d 
at 337. 
 91 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1110; see also 73 Op. Neb. Att’y Gen. (1985), 1985 WL 168575, at 
*1. 
 92 Maine has a similar statute, which likewise has apparently not been construed by reported 
cases. ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 957 (1975). 
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Oklahoma cases reflect disfavor of extraterritorial application of law.93 Ok-
lahoma’s current jurisdictional statute is drafted more broadly:  
The following persons are liable to punishment under the laws of 
this State: 
1. All persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime within 
the State. 
2. All who commit theft out of this state, and bring, or are found 
with the property stolen, in this state. 
3. All who, being out of this state, abduct or kidnap, by force or 
fraud, any person contrary to the laws of the place where such act 
is committed, and bring, send, or convey such person within the 
limits of this state, and are afterward found therein. 
4. And all who, being out of this state, cause or aid, advise or en-
courage, another person, causing an injury to any person or prop-
erty within this state by means of any act or neglect which is de-
clared criminal by this code, and who are afterward found within 
this state.94 
At least subsection 1 could apply to an Oklahoman who, while in Oklaho-
ma, planned a trip to Colorado or Washington for the purpose of possessing 
or using marijuana,95 because part of the crime was committed within the 
state. If the trip is planned with more than one person, a conspiracy charge 
might be available.96 Many jurisdictions require that the offense be crimi-
                                                                                                                           
 93 Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. State, 116 P. 176, 178 (Okla. 1911) (stating that prohibition laws 
“do not attach until the delivery of the same to the consignee within the state by the interstate 
carrier. It cannot be successfully maintained that such laws attach to the liquor without the state, 
and have an extraterritorial effect so as to make it unlawful for the interstate carrier to receive such 
shipment in another state for delivery in this state. No authority has been cited to that effect, and 
none can be found. The opposite in law is a truism.”); State v. Eighteen Casks of Beer, 104 P. 
1093, 1095 (Okla. 1909) (“It might be very convenient and useful in the execution of the policy of 
prohibition within the state to extend the powers of the state beyond its territorial limits. But such 
extraterritorial powers cannot be assumed upon such an implication. On the contrary, the nature of 
the case contradicts their existence; for, if they belong to one state, they belong to all, and cannot 
be exercised severally and independently. The attempt would necessarily produce that conflict and 
confusion which it was the very purpose of the Constitution by its delegations of national power to 
prevent.”). 
 94 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 151 (2014). 
 95 State v. Fletcher, 133 P.3d 339, 341 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (“To prove Appellee guilty of 
attempt the State is required to prove the intent to commit a specified crime, performance of some 
overt act towards its commission and failure of consummation.” (citing Weimar v. State, 556 P.2d 
1020, 1024 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976))); see also People v. Betts, 103 P.3d 883, 893 (Cal. 2005) 
(“These acts [inside the State of California] were not merely de minimus; they furthered the com-
pletion of the charged offenses by removing the girls from the protection of their mother and 
providing defendant with opportunities to be alone with each of them.”). 
 96 People v. Morante, 975 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Cal. 1999) (“California courts have jurisdiction 
over the criminal prosecution of a defendant for conspiracy to commit an offense where the de-
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nalized in the out-of-state jurisdiction.97 On the other hand, it is not clear 
that that is either a universal rule or a constitutional requirement.98 Because 
Colorado and Washington have made clear that they have merely withheld 
punishment, not affirmatively authorized or encouraged the use of marijua-
na, it is hard to argue that prosecution of an Oklahoman in Oklahoma would 
conflict with the interests of those states. 
                                                                                                                           
fendant, within the State of California, both entered into an agreement to commit the offense and 
committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, but the offense that is the object of the conspiracy 
was committed in another jurisdiction.”); see also Mathews v. State, 198 P. 112, 113 (Okla. Crim. 
1921). 
 97 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 20.30(1) (McKinney 2017) (“[T]he courts of this state do not 
have jurisdiction to convict a person of an alleged offense partly committed within this state but 
consummated in another jurisdiction, [or of solicitation, conspiracy, attempt, or facilitation], un-
less the conduct . . . constitutes an offense under the laws of such other jurisdiction as well as 
under the laws of this state.”); State v. Self, 706 P.2d 975, 978 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (“One may be 
criminally liable in Oregon for soliciting the commission of a crime in another state, so long as 
that other state’s offense has a counterpoint under Oregon law. Possession of cocaine is illegal in 
both Oregon and California. It is therefore permissible to charge a person in Oregon with the 
crime of soliciting possession of cocaine in California.”). 
 98 See Morante, 975 P.2d at 1086 (“We reserve for another day the issue whether a conspiracy 
in state to commit an act criminalized in this state but not in the jurisdiction in which the act is 
committed, also may be punished under California law.”). 
